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Psychological attachment to political parties can bias people’s attitudes, beliefs, and group 
evaluations. Studies from psychology suggest that self-affirmation theory may ameliorate this 
problem in the domain of politics on a variety of outcome measures. We report a series of studies 
conducted by separate research teams that examine whether a self-affirmation intervention 
affects a variety of outcomes, including political or policy attitudes, factual beliefs, conspiracy 
beliefs, affective polarization, and evaluations of news sources. The different research teams use 
a variety of self-affirmation interventions, research designs, and outcomes. Despite these 
differences, the research teams consistently find that self-affirmation treatments have little effect. 
These findings suggest considerable caution is warranted for researchers who wish to apply the 
self-affirmation framework to studies that investigate political attitudes and beliefs. By 
presenting the “null results” of separate research teams, we hope to spark a discussion about 













Self-Affirmation and Identity-Driven Political Behavior  
 
 
Psychological attachment to political parties and related identities and values can bias 
information processing, belief and attitude formation, and group evaluations. Researchers have 
sought to apply self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988) to this problem. Self-affirmation theory 
proposes that the overall goal of the self is to protect one’s view of their own self-integrity. In 
response to threats to this view, people act to restore self-worth through defensive reactions. 
Alternatively, though, self-worth can be restored through affirmation of other sources of 
self-integrity, such as one’s commitment to personally important values. This alternative route to 
protected self-integrity in the face of threatening information can reduce the need to rely on 
defensive biases  
Several studies report promising results in explicitly partisan contexts (Badea et al., 2016; 
Badea et al., 2017; Binning et al., 2010; Binning et al., 2015; Carnahan et al., 2018; Cohen et al., 
2007; Van Prooijen et al., 2014), which they interpret as demonstrating that affirming people’s 
self-worth in non-political domains might serve to reduce defensive or biased behavior resulting 
from a perceived risk to one’s identity or self-concept. This general finding — that 
self-affirmation may ameliorate partisan biases — has since been canonized in reviews (Sherman 
& Cohen 2006; Cohen & Sherman, 2014). While the broader self-affirmation literature in 
psychology is voluminous, recent studies have called into question the uniformity of its effects 
(e.g., Reavis et al., 2017). Large-scale replications (Hanselman et al., 2017; Protzko & Aronson, 
2016) suggest that self-affirmation interventions may be “fragile” in some domains of social 
psychology (but see Borman et al., 2018). 
In this article, we report a series of studies conducted independently by separate research 
teams that examine self-affirmation in political contexts. We employ conceptual extensions of 
prior work applying self-affirmation to politics, rather than close replications.  Indeed, our goal 
was to add more evidence about previous self-affirmation applications’ effectiveness in new, but 
theoretically related outcomes in politics.  In other words, we apply self-affirmation procedures 
to new political outcomes of interest, and note how and if we depart from any prior work that 
found significant effects. Our results find that self-affirmation treatments consistently have little 
effect across a range of samples and outcome measures (attitudes, factual beliefs, conspiracy 
beliefs, affective polarization, and evaluations of news sources).​1​ Our hope is that these findings 
help unite evidence about the study of self-affirmation in political contexts. The studies we 
report suggest that self-affirmation may have more limited potential in political contexts than 
previously thought. We hope that future scholars considering using self-affirmation in a political 
context will consider the evidence about the prior literature we collect here, as well as the variety 
of interventions and designs we report, and that these results will be useful to future work 
considering self-affirmation’s potential to reduce partisan biases.  
Table 1. Summary of prior studies testing self-affirmation in political contexts 
 






Subject Matter Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Sample Year Country Key 
Estimate 
Cohen et al 
2007 Study 1 
Information following full 
cross of SA/self-threat X 
convictions/rationality 
prime 
9/11 Openness to 
information  
Students (N=43) ? US SA X 
salience: 
F(1, 38) = 
4.62, p = 
.038. 
Cohen et al 
2007 Study 2 
Information between full 
cross of SA/self-threat X 
convictions prime 




? US SA X 
salience: 
F(1, 29) = 
8.03, p = 
.008 
Cohen et al 
2007 Study 3 
Information between full 
cross of SA/self-threat  X 
commitment/compromise 
prime 
Abortion Number of acceptable 




? US SA X 
salience: 
F(1, 33) = 
8.98, p = 
.005 




US politics/ debate 
performance 
Candidate evaluations Convenience, other 
(N=110), partisans 
2008 US SA X party: 
F(1, 105) = 
5.77, p = 
.018 
Van Prooijen 
et al 2013 
SA without information 
treatment 
Climate change Perceptions of 
pro-environmental 
behaviours 
Students (N=90) ? UK SA X 
worldview: B 
= .32, p = 
.01, B = -.49, 
p < .001, B = 
.23, p = .07, 
B =.15, p = 
.25 
Van Prooijen 
et al 2014 
Information following 
randomized SA 
Climate change  a) acceptance of climate 
change risk b) efficacy 
Students (N=88) ? UK SA X initial 
beliefs: B = 
−0.52, p  = 




The theory of self-affirmation is based on the premise that people resist threats to their 
sense-of-self (e.g., processing counterattitudinal political information in a biased manner) ​and 
that self-integrity can cross domains. In other words, defensive processing in one aspect of a 
person’s self-concept may be tempered by bolstering another (Steele, 1988). According to this 
account, threats in one domain lose their potency when self-worth is affirmed in other core 
aspects of one’s self-worth, eliminating the need for ego protection. This elegant theoretical 
−0.61, p = 
.007 
Binning et al 
2015 Study 1 
Information following full 
cross of SA and 
information treatment 
Obama/US politics Approval ratings Convenience, other 
(N=115), 
Democrats 
2009 US SA X 
normative 
info: F(1, 
111) = 3.93, 
p = .050.  
Binning et al 
2015 Study 2 
Full cross of SA and 
4-cell information 
treatment (2 X 2 X 2) 
Obama/US politics Approval ratings Convenience, other 
(N=159), 
Republicans 
2010 US SA X 
direction X 
data type: 
F(1, 151) = 
3.99, p = 
.047 
Binning et al 
2015 Study 3 
Full cross of SA and 
information treatment 
Obama/US politics Approval ratings MTurk (N=224) 2012 US SA X  article 
X American 
ID: B = –.76, 
SE = .37, B 
= –.25, p = 
.043 
 




left/right values) without 
information treatment 
 
Refugees Behavioral intent toward 
refugees 
Students (N=192) ? France SA X 
value-type X 
congruence: 
b = -.44, p = 
.03 












Students (N=240) ? France SA X 
individualism
: B = −0.16, 
p < .05, 
−0.20, p < 
.01, B = 
−0.09, n.s., 
B = −0.24, p 
< .001.  
 
Carnahan et 





(education policy)  
Change in belief 
accuracy 
SSI (N=301) 2016 US SA X 
attitude: B = 
-.12, p < .05 
Carnahan et 
al 2018 Study 
2 
Full cross of SA and 
information treatment 
GMOs Change in belief 
accuracy 
MTurk (N=509) 2017 US SA X attitude 
X correction : 
B = −.16, p < 
.05 
account explains a general problem (biased processing), a mechanism (ego-defending 
reactions in response to threat), and a potential solution (debiasing by affirming one’s 
sense-of-self in an unrelated domain). Self-affirmation is canonically induced by way of 
writing prompts that ask respondents to reflect on important values or characteristics they 
hold, and describe experiences in which these were exhibited or played an important role in 
their life.  
The core tenet of the self-affirmation approach is that threats to highly central or salient 
social identities could result in significant “costs” which promotes defensive responses absent 
alternative sources of self-integrity (Sherman & Cohen, 2006, p. 218; Cohen et al., 2007). 
Previous literature suggests that threats to social identity (such as one’s political affiliation) can 
be buffered through affirmation, which could lead to less anchoring of group evaluations in one’s 
self-concept and thereby allowing individuals to evaluate groups independent of their 
self-evaluation (Cohen et al., 2000). The importance of the domain, or particular social group, is 
supposed to condition the degree of self-threat and therefore the effectiveness of affirmation 
(Boninger et al., 1995). Consequently, any given self-affirmation intervention is not predicted to 
affect everyone equally. Rather, the effect should be conditional or contingent for those who are 
being confronted with a threat to their identity. Consequently, each of the studies we present here 
examines the effect of self-affirmation on the appropriate target population.  
An important qualifying condition for the relevance of the self-affirmation approach is to 
establish that political identities are available to people. Klar (2013) shows that partisan identity 
can be made salient through mere mention. Asking questions about respondents’ feelings toward 
their own party and the opposing party, as would commonly occur in a survey about political 
topics, makes partisan identity salient. Threat is an even more powerful means of raising salience 
(Klar, 2013). For strong partisans or those with strong prior attitudes, many of the experimental 
set-ups themselves constitute a threat. For example, those with strong beliefs against the 
scientific consensus on climate change view contrary information as a threat (Ma et al., 2019). 
Partisans sometimes see the opposing party as a threat to their way of life (Iyengar et al., 2019). 
Mason (2018) compellingly shows the centrality to partisanship to identity and the extent to 
which this generates powerful negative affect towards political outgroups, creating clear 
opportunities to experience the type threat that self-affirmation is theorized to protect against. In 
sum, for strong partisans, questions about political beliefs and feelings toward political groups 
themselves generate reactance and negative emotion. Under these conditions, former work 
predicts we should see self-affirmation reduce negative attitudes or group conformity (see e.g., 
van Prooijen et al 2014).  
 
A summary of each study’s approach can be found in Table 2. Further detail can be found 




































Immigration  Belief extremity; belief 
superiority  
 
MTurk (N = 400)  2016 



















Selection of studies 
The corresponding author solicited “file drawer” studies examining self-affirmation and 
political behavior, regardless of findings, in March 2018. No studies nominated in the process 
were excluded. All authors then shared data allowing for a parallel analysis, as described below. 
Over the course of the project, three research teams published articles based on the data provided 
to the corresponding author. (We report all findings from the different research teams using the 
same analytic strategy. The results we report here for studies that were accepted during this 
process are substantively consistent with the published version, but the model specifications and 
Research Team H  Full cross of SA 
and information 
treatment 





































































point estimates are different.) To aid the reader, we have created separate tables to distinguish 
between published and unpublished studies.  
We report results from a number of studies that examine various outcomes in which 
political identity may drive biases. Specifically, we look at self-affirmation’s potential to 
mitigate conspiracy beliefs (e.g., ​Miller & Saunders 2016; Oliver & Wood 2014), affective 
polarization (e.g., Iyengar et al. 2019;  Mason, 2018), belief superiority (e.g., Saucier & Webster, 
2010), news evaluations (e.g., Pingree et al., 2014), and various forms of party-aligned factual 
beliefs (e.g., Taber & Lodge 2006;  Kahan & Braman 2006). 
 
Analytic approach 
Social psychology experiments that examine the role that self-affirmation may have in 
reducing bias or extremity typically fall into three types. The first type of study looks at the 
effect of self-affirmation for relevant vs. non-relevant groups (Van Koningsbruggen et al, 2009; 
Sherman et al, 2000; Harris & Napper, 2005; Correll et al, 2004; ​Binning et al., 2010​). For 
example, a message detailing coffee’s health effects may be shown to drinkers and non-drinkers. 
A typical study would randomly assign subjects to a self-affirmation task (vs placebo task), and 
then show all participants the same stimulus. Analysis would then focus on the effects of 
self-affirmation for relevant versus non-relevant groups. Research Team D follows this 
approach.  
The second type of study examines the effect of self-affirmation on attitudes and extreme 
beliefs without an information treatment. These studies randomize assignment to a 
self-affirmation task (vs a placebo task), and then measure outcomes of interest (e.g., Lehmiller 
et al., 2010). While not always framed in this way, from a political science perspective one can 
see these studies as assessing whether self-affirmation makes people more amenable to 
considering counter-attitudinal information already encoded when constructing a survey 
response, a la Zaller (1992).  Research Teams A, B, C, F, and G studies follow this approach. 
Finally, some researchers examine how self-affirmation influences information 
processing in the face of threat by concurrently manipulating both self-affirmation and 
information treatments. For example, Reavis et al. (2017) examine how affirmation moderates 
the effect of a threatening article correcting the MMR-autism link (versus a placebo article) on 
intent to vaccinate. Some of our studies follow this route (Teams E and H) 
As a result, we take two approaches to analysis. First, w​e look at each study as a 2-cell 
experiment in which participants were randomly assigned to self-affirmation or a control 
treatment. We construct our analyses so that stimuli were either uniform across all participants or 
absent. While this approach easily incorporates studies that only manipulate self-affirmation, we 
need to take an extra step to incorporate studies that also manipulate information. When 
participants were shown one of two information treatments (Team H; Team E study 3), we split 
the study into two analyses  — one for each information treatment. Thus, the analyses examine 
the effect of receiving being self-affirmed versus not being self-affirmed for those who received 
an information treatment. When the control group received no information (Team E studies 1 
and 2), we only include cells where participants received the information treatment;​2​ again 
comparing the effect of being self-affirmed versus not being self-affirmed for those who receive 
an information treatment. (To make sure all cells are analyzed, the supplementary analyses 
include any cells that were excluded given the approach above.) 
2 We drop from these analyses irrelevant conditions, such as alternate (non-self-affirmation) treatment 
arms (Teams C, D, and F studies). 
We use OLS regression with robust standard errors to estimate the effect of 
self-affirmation in each study. In each model, we estimate the effect of the affirmation treatment 
as an indicator variable, as well as a relevant moderator — such as party identity or strength of 
partisanship — and the corresponding interaction term identified by the authors. To compare 
effects directly, we rescale all dependent variables to range from 0 to 1.  
 
Treatment of multiple outcome measures  
Some studies collected multiple relevant dependent variables. We deal with this in two 
ways. In the Teams B, G, and H analyses, we create a composite item due to high internal 
consistency among measures, which also reduces measurement error and improves power 
(Ansolabehere, Rodden, & Snyder 2008). In cases where dependent variables are potentially 
orthogonal to one another, we analyze the effects of the self-affirmation treatment on each 
dependent variable separately.  
Summary of results 
We find no main effects across the studies. However, the theory of self-affirmation 
expects that effects should be limited to specific (threatened or counter-attitudinal) subgroups. 
Therefore we relegate these analyses to the appendix. Our focus now is on the interaction 
between self-affirmation and an indicator variable identifying the relevant (threatened or 
coutnerattitudinal) subgroups. In Figure 1, we plot regression coefficients for all interactions of 




Figure 1. Interaction terms across unpublished studies 
 
Notes:  All outcome variables re-scaled to range from 0-1. Corresponding statistical information 






























Liberal conspiracy beliefs (Team 
A) 3796 0.02 
0.0
1 0.00 0.05 
Conservative conspiracy beliefs 
(Team A) 3797 0.01 
0.0
1 -0.01 0.03 
Climate change attitudes (Team 
B) 696 -0.03 
0.0
2 -0.07 0.01 
Belief superiority (Team F) 393 -0.01 
0.0
4 -0.09 0.07 
Belief  extremity (Team F) 393 0.00 
0.0
3 -0.07 0.06 
Affective polarization (Team G) 204 -0.02 
0.0
5 -0.12 0.07 
 Outparty intolerance (Team G)  204 0.08 
0.0
8 -0.08 0.23 
Outparty intolerance 2 (Team G) 203 0.00 
0.0
8 -0.16 0.16 
News evaluations (Climate 
change hoax condition, Team H)  235 0.01 
0.0
3 -0.06 0.07 
News evaluations (Climate 
change  real condition, Team H)  220 0.01 
0.0











Affective polarization (Team C) 1334 -0.01 
0.0
1 -0.03 0.01 
 
The interaction term of the pooled (​Neyeloff et al., 2012)​ unpublished studies is b = .007, SE = 
.038 (95% CI: -.067, .081), though we urge caution due to the differing outcome measures across 
these studies (Carpenter, 2020). The interaction term when pooling all of the studies in the 
present manuscript (including those published) is b = -.019, SE = .052 (95% CI: -.120, .083).  
 
Finally, when re-analyzing the experiments that included information treatments (Team E 




Can self-affirmation mitigate the psychological effects of partisanship and polarization? 
This article pools a number of studies undertaken by independent research teams to test this 
claim. Across studies, contexts, and outcomes of interests, we found little evidence that 
self-affirmation manipulations have ameliorative effects.  
Prior work in the self-affirmation literature reveals that such effects may be contingent on 
a number of factors  (e.g., Ferrer & Cohen, 2019; Borman et al., 2018). For this reason, our 
Discussion polarization  (Team 
C) 1338 -0.02 
0.0
1 -0.05 0.00 
Outparty danger (Team C) 1345 -0.03 
0.0
2 -0.06 0.00 
Social distance (Team C) 1333 0.02 
0.0
2 -0.01 0.05 
Outparty blame (Team D) 130 -0.04 
0.0
9 -0.22 0.14 
Risk perception  (Team D) 274 0.00 
0.0
4 -0.08 0.08 
ISAF insurgent attacks (Graph 
condition , Team E) 525 0.00 
0.0
2 -0.04 0.05 
Jobs (Obama approval 
moderator, graph condition, 
Team E) 247 0.02 
0.0
6 -0.10 0.13 
Jobs (Economy MIP moderator, 
graph condition, Team E) 247 0.01 
0.0
6 -0.10 0.12 
Anthropogenic GW  (Text 
condition , Team E) 122 -0.05 
0.1
7 -0.38 0.28 
Anthropogenic GW (Graph 
condition, Team E)  122 -0.31 
0.1
5 -0.62 -0.01 
Temperature trend  (Text 
condition, Team E) 122 -0.03 
0.0
8 -0.19 0.13 
Temperature trend  (graph 
condition, Team E) 121 -0.06 
0.0
8 -0.23 0.10 
analyses focus on moderation effects, as self-affirmation effects should be found for those who 
care more about politics and/or those most threatened by inconvenient claims or by interactions 
with their political opponents. In this collection of studies, we offer evidence of a number of 
scenarios in which self-affirmation does not seem to improve outcomes, even among these 
subgroups.  
These findings should be understood in the context of their limitations. The previously 
unpublished studies we report draw on samples of varying size --- though some are large (n = 
3,799) others instead rely on sample sizes resembling those in the existing self-affirmation 
literature, which are under-powered to detect interaction effects (Blake & Gangestad, 2020 ). In 
other words, these findings should also be considered in the context of prior work that motivated 
these studies. While all teams were excited by the potential of self-affirmation to address 
phenomena with strong normative implications -- misperceptions, conspiracy belief, and 
polarization -- the relatively limited evidentiary value provided by the small sample sizes of and 
inconsistent methods of prior studies (Table 1) is clearer in hindsight. These prior studies often 
show contingent effects, though little work has directly replicated the specific contingencies, 
which vary from study to study. At the same time, the studies presented here may be missing key 
features necessary for self-affirmation to work. If the work presented here can help clarify the 
limits of self-affirmation, we believe that would be a valuable contribution.​3 
 
Kotcher (2016, p. 68-9) provides a potential empirical explanation for the self-affirmation 
method’s inconsistent effects:  
 
3 ​Notably, recent works suggest that “​heterogeneity and moderation of effects is unlikely for a zero average true 
effect size, but increasingly likely for larger average true effect size,” (Olsson-Collentine et al., 2020). As such, the 
search for  potential hidden moderators may be by more costly than its contribution to the scientific record merits. 
“self-affirmation not only can activate multiple psychological processes, but […] it 
may activate both productive and counter-productive processes simultaneously… 
This suggests that self-affirmation is at the same time both more complex than 
previously understood […] and less precise as a potential intervention than one 
might hope.”  
 
Given this richness and complexity, self-affirmation may remain a topic worthy of study for 
its own sake. At the same time, self-affirmation interventions may not be precise enough to 
allow researchers to produce normatively desirable outcomes without the danger of 
concurrently eliciting negative responses. Or, the true effects of self-affirming people may be 
null or artifactual. Indeed, there is evidence of publication bias in other literatures applying 
the self-affirmation framework (Weisz et al., 2016; see also Protzko & Aronson, 2016). We 
hope the findings presented here help form a more complete picture of self-affirmation effects 
on an assortment of identity-driven cognitive and affective phenomena.  
With these null results, we also offer a number of research design suggestions for 
those who wish to continue exploring whether self-affirmation interventions can produce 
normatively desirable outcomes related to politics. We encourage researchers to use 
preregistered designed that employ samples large enough to detect the interaction effects that 
this theory proposes (Blake & Gangestad, 2020) or to precisely estimate null results. The 
results we report rely on conceptual replications. Direct replications (with samples large 
enough to reliably detect interaction effects) may help identify whether the eight separate 
research teams whose work is presented here simply erred in how they applied 
self-affirmation, or whether the approach is less   useful than previously thought.  
Others might wish to advance work summarized in Tables 1 and 2 by manipulating 
identity salience or threat directly. ​The ​experimental manipulation​ of threat may be key to 
uncovering self-affirmation effects (Ferrer & Cohen., 2019). Indeed, we see this as an unclear 
proposition given the present state of the literature. While Cohen et al. (2007) manipulate 
salience, other studies (Binning et al., Badea et al., van Prooijen et al., and Carnahan et al.) do 
not. Moreover, our view is that none of these studies manipulate ​threat​ to identity. 
Consequently, it is hard to establish that any positive effects of a self-affirmation intervention 
are contingent on salience or threat manultipations. Cohen et al. (2007) complicate matters by 
comparing self-affirmation not to a control, but to a “self-threat” condition where participants 
report a time they failed to live up to an important value. Experimental paradigms that can 
reliably induce identity threat may help identify when and where self-affirmation 
interventions outside the lab may be effective.  
Typically, self-affirmation research does not employ manipulation checks for the same 
reason studies manipulating self-esteem do not: the manipulation check itself may prime the 
intended state (McQueen & Klein, 2006). The development of manipulation checks that can 
evaluate whether a self-affirmation treatment is working as intended (without doubly treating 
respondents) would be a significant advance. Without manipulation checks, it is hard to know 
whether it is one’s theory that has failed, or simply one’s procedures that have failed (though 




In this paper we present a number of studies that attempted to apply the 
self-affirmation paradigm to political topics. We bring together the work of eight separate 
research teams who conducted 11 separate experiments. These different research teams were 
all motivated by the promising results of studies presented in Table 1 to use self-affirmation 
as a tool to, for lack a better word, improve politics in some way. Unfortunately, 
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H1: Does Self-Affirmation Mitigate the Effect of Motivated Conspiracy Endorsement? 
 
Self-affirmation will mitigate the impact of motivated conspiracy endorsement. In other words, 
respondents who are given the opportunity to self-affirm will be less likely to feel the need to engage 
in ideologically motivated conspiracy endorsement to bolster their worldviews than those who are not 




2 cell. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. The first condition provided 




We recruited 4,349 US adults from MTurk, through TurkPrime. Our analyses focus on the 3,337 
self-identified conservatives and liberals. We also replicate our findings with party identification 
instead of ideology; for those analyses, we focus on the 3,799 self-identified Republicans and 





Self-affirmation manipulation​. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of two conditions, in 
which they were (n=2,107) or were not (n=2,238) given the opportunity to self-affirm.  
 
After the self-affirmation manipulation, respondents answered two “filler” questions about their 
interest in politics, and then proceeded to the conspiracy theory battery, followed by ideology, 
demographic, and personality questions. 
 
We used a self-affirmation manipulation adapted from Cohen, Aronson, and Steele (2000; see also 
Nyhan & Reifler 2019). Respondents assigned to the self-affirmation condition saw the following 
prompt:  
 
“In this portion of the study, we would like to ask you some questions about your ideas, your 
beliefs, and your life. When you respond to these questions, please bear in mind that there are 
no right or wrong answers. Below is a list of characteristics and values, some of which may be 
important to you, some of which may be unimportant. Looking at this list, please check the 
box next to the characteristic or value that is MOST important to you.”  
 
The list included the following characteristics and values: artistic skills/aesthetic appreciation, sense of 
humor, relations with friends/family, spontaneity/living life in the moment, social skills, athletics, 
musical ability/appreciation, physical attractiveness, creativity, business/managerial skills, and 
romantic values. On the next screen, the self-affirmation respondents saw the following prompt:  
 
“In a brief paragraph, please describe a personal experience in which X characteristic or value 
[filled with the one that they chose as the MOST important] was especially important to you 
and made you feel good about yourself. Focus on your thoughts and feelings, and don't worry 
about spelling, grammar, or how well written it is.”  
 
After 30 seconds, the “next” button appeared at the bottom of the screen, at which time respondents 
could move on to the next questions (two political interest questions, followed by the conspiracy 
theory battery). The purpose of the 30-second delay was to ensure that respondents did not simply 
click past the text box and proceed to the rest of the survey. 
 
Respondents assigned to the control condition saw the following prompt, “Please list everything you 
have had to eat or drink in the last 48 hours. Do not worry about those things you find yourself unable 
to remember.” After 30 seconds, the “next” button appeared at the bottom of the screen, at which time 
control respondents could move on to same questions as the self-affirmation respondents (two political 
interest items, followed by the conspiracy theory battery). We created a dummy variable to represent 





Moderator variables​.  
For political ideology, we recoded the standard seven-point ideology measure into a Conservative 
dummy variable. Respondents who said they were “extremely conservative,” “conservative,” or 
“slightly conservative” were coded as a 1 (n=1,148) and those who said they were “extremely liberal,” 
“liberal,” or “slightly liberal” were coded as a 0 (n=2,189). We replicated our analyses with party 
identification by recoding the standard seven-point branched party identification question into a 
Republican dummy variable. Respondents who said identified as strong, not very strong, or leaning 
Republicans were coded as a 1 (n=1,250), and those who identified as strong, not very strong, or 
leaning Democrats were coded as a 0 (n=2,549). 
 
Dependent variables​.  
What most conspiracy theory definitions have in common is the notion that conspiracies comprise the 
belief that actors, usually more powerful than the average citizen, are engaging in wide-ranging, 
“black-boxed” activities to which individuals can attribute an insidious explanation to a confusing 
event. To assess conspiracy endorsement, we selected 13 questions that met the following criteria: 1) 
they fit the definition of a conspiracy theory, 2) they are relatively familiar to our respondents, and 3) 
they are political and ideological in nature. 
 
We began with seven of the eight conspiracy theories we assessed in our previous work (for 
replication purposes see Miller et al. 2016a). Four are items that we found conservatives were more 
likely to endorse: Obama was not born in the U.S., the 2010 Affordable Care Act included death 
panels, global warming is a hoax, and Saddam Hussein was involved in the 9/11 attacks. The other 
three are items that we found liberals were more likely to endorse: the government intentionally 
breached flood levees during Hurricane Katrina to protect middle-class homes, the Bush 
administration knew about 9/11 before it happened, and Republicans stole the 2004 election via voter 
fraud in Ohio.  
 
To the four “conservative” items (i.e., ones that impugned leaders and institutions on the left, and that 
conservatives were therefore more likely to endorse), we added an additional three: the Jade Helm 15 
military exercise was a scheme cooked up by President Obama to confiscate firearms from 
law-abiding citizens, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and others in the administration are 
involved in a cover-up surrounding the Benghazi terrorist attack, and the Democratically controlled 
Congress supported policies aimed at causing the 2008 financial crisis to push for greater federal 
government control over US banks and corporations.  
 
To the three “liberal” items (i.e., ones that impugned leaders and institutions on the right, and that 
liberals were therefore more likely to endorse), we added an additional three: the largest banks in the 
US manipulate the economy for their financial gain, the Koch brothers are behind a hidden plot to 
destabilize the American government, and the Bush administration faked employment statistics in 
2007 to obscure the seriousness of the financial crisis to protect the US banking industry and 
Republicans running for re-election in 2008. 
 
Responses to each of the thirteen conspiracy questions were coded on four-point scales ranging from 
0-1, with higher numbers representing greater endorsement. The seven items that we suspected would 
be more attractive to conservatives and Republicans were averaged to create a ​conservative index 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .75). The six items that we suspected would be more attractive to liberals and 








H1: Self-affirmation will lead to more favorable changes among political conservatives, and to a lesser 
degree in moderates, in terms of key beliefs about, perceived importance of, and policy support to address 
climate change, whereas its effect on liberals will be indistinct. 
 
Design  
I conducted a randomized, controlled survey experiment with a 2 cell (traditional self-affirmation essay 
vs. control task) design.  
Sample 
Participants were recruited by an external vendor (Toluna) that maintains an online panel of participants 
who have agreed to participate in online surveys. Participants were quota-matched to recruit a 
demographically diverse sample that approximately reflects national proportions of age, gender, 
education, and Hispanic ethnicity found in the U.S. Census. Specifically, the sample was 48.2% male and 
51.8% female; 83% non- Hispanic or non-Latino and 17% Hispanic or Latino; the median age was 
between 45-54; and the median level of education was “some college”.  
A total sample of n=696 individuals completed the survey cells in question.  
Procedure  
Traditional Self-Affirmation. This study utilized a value essay self-affirmation manipulation widely used 
in previous research (for a review, see McQueen & Klein, 2006). Participants were asked to rank a list of 
11 values developed by Harber (1995; e.g., Artistic skills/aesthetic appreciation, Sense of humor, 
Relations with friends/family) in terms of their personal importance. Next, participants were asked to 
think about the value they ranked as the most important to them, and then to take a few minutes to write 
about three or four personal experiences in which this value was important to them and made them feel 
good about themselves. This procedure, along with this list of values, has been used in a number of prior 
studies (e.g., Binning, Brick, Cohen, & Sherman, 2015; Cohen, Aronson, & Steele, 2000; Zhao, Peterson, 
Kim, & Rolfe-Redding, 2014).  
No affirmation control task. Individuals in these conditions were asked write down everything they ate or 
drank in the last 48 hours. Furthermore, individuals were instructed to “not worry about those things you 
find yourself unable to remember.” This task has been used as a control in a number of previous studies 
because it is believed that almost any self-reflective writing task can potentially be self-affirming (e.g., 
Cohen et al., 2000; van Prooijen & Sparks, 2013).  
Measures  
Dependent Variables  
Belief certainty that climate change is happening. Two items were used to compute a nine-point scale 
measuring certainty that climate change is happening. The first item asked respondents whether they think 
climate change is happening with response options being yes, no, or don’t know. Individuals who 
answered yes or no were then asked a follow up question which asked how sure they were that climate 
change is/is not happening (1=not at all sure, 4=extremely sure). The new variable combined responses to 
these two items such that 1=extremely sure climate change is not happening, 3 = somewhat sure climate 
change is not happening, 5=Don’t know, 7 = somewhat sure climate change is happening, 9=extremely 
sure climate change is happening (M=7.03, SD=2.08).  
Belief in human causation. A single, six-point item was used to measure the extent to which individuals 
think climate change is caused by human activities versus natural changes in the environment (1=None of 
the above because climate change isn’t happening, 2=Caused entirely by natural changes in the 
environment, 3=Caused mostly by natural changes in the environment 4=Caused about equally by human 
activities and natural changes in the environment, 5=Caused mostly by human activities 6=Caused 
entirely by human activities; M=4.23, SD=1.16).  
Worry about climate change. A single, 7-point item asked individuals, “How worried are you about 
climate change?” (1-Not at all worried, 7-Extremely worried; M=2.90, SD=1.24).  
Climate change issue importance. A single, 7-point item asked individuals, “How important is the issue of 
climate change to you personally?” (1-Not at all important, 7- Extremely important; M=3.03, SD=1.25).  
Perceived harm of climate change. Participants were asked to rate on a 7-point scale (1-Not at all, 7-A 
great deal), “How much do you think climate change will harm...” with four different targets: 1) you and 
your family, 2) people in the United States, 3) people in other countries, 4) future generations. Responses 
to these four items were averaged and combined into a single scale (M=4.94, SD=1.62, Cronbach’s 
α=0.938).  
Injunctive beliefs about climate change. Participants were asked on a 7-point scale whether they think the 
following entities should be doing “more or less to address climate change...” (1-should be doing much 
less, 4-currently doing about the right amount, 7- should be doing much more). The actors are: 1) your 
local government officials, 2) your state government, 3) The U.S. Congress, 4) The President. Responses 
to these four items were averaged and combined into a single scale (M=5.31, SD=1.73, Cronbach’s 
α=0.967).  
Climate change policy support. This variable was an averaged composite of responses to five different 
policies designed to address climate change. The question asked participants, “How much do you support 
or oppose the following policies?” (1-Strongly oppose, 4-Neither support nor oppose, 7-Strongly support; 
M=4.82, SD=1.12, Cronbach’s α=0.734).  
Political participation intentions. This variable was an averaged index of responses to the question, “Over 
the next 12 months, how likely are you to do each of the following?” (1-Very unlikely, 4-Neutral, 7-Very 
likely). The behaviors are: 1) Write letters, email, or phone government officials about climate change, 2) 
Attend a community meeting or rally about climate change, 3) Sign a petition about climate change, either 
online or in person, 4) Donate money to an organization working to reduce climate change, 5) Vote for a 
political candidate because they support action to reduce climate change (M=3.70, SD=1.84, Cronbach’s 
α=0.921).  
These items were averaged into a single composite climate attitudes outcome (alpha = .91) 
Moderator  
Political ideology. A single, 5-point scale asked individuals, “In general, do you think of yourself as...” 




Hypothesis 1: Self-affirmation techniques will reduce affective polarization. 




2 cell: Subjects were randomly assigned a self-affirmation treatment condition, or an apolitical control.  
Sample 
The experiment was conducted by GfK Custom Research (previously Knowledge Networks), which uses 
random digit dialing and address-based sampling to recruit representative samples of the US population 
for studies such as this one. A total of 2,095 respondents completed the survey on April 15–25, 2016, for 
a completion rate of 55 percent and an AAPOR Response Rate 3 of 4.8 percent. After dropping other 
treatment arms, a total of n = 1345 respondents remained. The study was conducted through Time Sharing 
Experiments for the Social Sciences (TESS); the TESS proposal— which serves as the pre-analysis plan 
for this experiment—is provided in the online appendix. 
 
Procedure 
For the self-affirmation treatment, I follow McQueen and Klein (2006)  and ask subjects to pick a 





Affective polarization was measured in three ways:  
1. 100-pt. Feeling thermometer ratings of the political parties (Abramowitz and Webster Forthcoming, 
Hetherington and Rudolph 2015) (difference score M = .36.30, SD = 34.33) 
2. Social distance measures (i.e., friends with out-party, see Iyengar et al. 2012, Levendusky and Malhotra 
2015) (4-pt., M = 1.78, SD = .79). 
3. Whether the other party’s ideas are so extreme they are dangerous for the health of the nation (Pew 
Research Center 2014) (5-pt., M = 3.94, SD = .98).  
This study also included a “downstream” measure: 
4. Whether respondent would like to discuss political topics in a partisan homogeneous or heterogeneous 
group (Klar 2014) (ranges from -3 to 3, M = .74, SD = 1.11).  
Moderators 
Partisanship strength (4-pt.)  
Team D 
Hypotheses: 
H1. Self-affirmation will reduce group-aligned belief 










Data were collected using Amazon Mechanical Turk’s (mTurk) panel of online workers. All 
participants were compensated monetarily. 257 participants were recruited for Study 1 in October 




Participants in the self-affirmation condition were provided with a list of personal values. After 
selecting the most personally important value, they were instructed to write about why the value is 
important to them. The list (Personal Values Questionnaire II, Cullen, 2014) is similar to most 
common affirmation instruments (e.g., Nyhan & Reifler, 2019) but gives greater focus to internal 
values.  
 
Individuals in the control were asked write down everything they ate or drank in the last 48 hours. 
 
Following the writing prompt, participants completed a battery of manipulation checks. Next, they 
were informed that they would be asked about “a recent event in the news. An investigation by the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency at an Alaskan mine went badly awry earlier this year, 
triggering a spill of zinc, iron, copper, and other heavy metals into the water supply.” Next, 
participants read a news story on the spill that reported two statements from each group (Republicans 
vs. Democrats and the EPA) that blamed the other for the spill. Participants then reported their belief 





Group-aligned belief​ was computed based on the following factual beliefs: “The EPA probably 
allowed the toxic spill to occur on purpose,” (M = 3.02, SD = 1.69); “The EPA probably is not being 
held to the same standard they would apply to a private business,” (M = 4.57, SD = 1.58); “Republican 
lawmakers were probably willing to risk the spill in order to discredit the EPA,” (M = 4.10, SD = 
1.73); and “Republicans are probably using the spill to undercut the Obama administration’s rollout of 
emissions regulations,” (M = 4.47, SD = 1.69). Beliefs that blamed Republicans were reverse coded so 
that all beliefs ranged from Democrat-aligned (1) to Republican-aligned (7). These were combined, 
recoded with a midpoint at 0, and crossed with respondent party to create a final group-aligned belief 




To test for interventions’ effects across levels of group identification, strength of party affiliation 






598 participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk in March 2016 (after dropping irrelevant 




The Study 2 procedure replicated Study 1, except with the context altered to a partisan dispute over a 
fictional advanced biofuels mandate. The news story was presented as a two-minute news video, with 
the transcript embedded below. The video included claims regarding the benefits of an advanced 
biofuels mandate, attributed to Democrats, and claims regarding risks, attributed to Republicans. 





Risk and benefit beliefs were measured on 7-pt. scales (1 = ​strongly disagree​, 7 = ​strongly agree​). 
These items were drawn from prior studies (see Fung et al., 2014), and covered economic, 
environmental, and social aspects of biofuels technology. Risk perception was measured with six 
items, Chronbach’s ​⍺​ = .85, M = 3.77, SD = 1.21. Benefit perception was also measured with six 
items, Chronbach’s ​⍺​ = .90, M = 5.21, SD = 1.13. ​Group-aligned beliefs ​were calculated by 
subtracting risk from benefits and crossing with respondent party, excluding true independents (M = 
.69 SD = 1.07, n = 507). This measure was converted to a standardized z-score. 
 
Moderator 




H1. Self-affirmation reduces partisan misperceptions 
Study 1  
Design 
2 (affirmation) X 2 (graph) between-subjects survey experiment. One manipulation randomly assigned 
respondents to an affirmation condition in which they were asked to recall an experience in which they 
felt good about themselves (Affirmation) or a control condition. Another randomly exposed respondents 
to graphical information about the troop surge in Iraq. 
Sample 
Study 1 was part of a pre-election module on the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey 
(CCES) that was administered by YouGov/Polimetrix in October 2008. The dataset consists of an Internet 
sample of 1000 people constructed from more than 50,000 opt-in respondents to approximate a random 
probability sample (Rivers, n.d.). After removing irrelevant cells of the study, n = 525.  
Overall, the sample is representative of the American population and matches known benchmarks well. 
Respondents are 48% male and 52% female. 73% are white, 12% are black, and 8% are Hispanic. 32% 
are age 18-34, 37% are 35-54, and 32% are 55 or older. Finally, 43% have a high school degree or less, 
32% have some college or a two-year degree, and 25% have a four-year college degree or more.  
 
In terms of party identification, our respondents are 37% Democrats, 27% independents (including leaners 
and identifiers of other parties), 27% Republicans, and 8% not sure, which almost perfectly matches the 
partisan distribution from telephone polls conducted in October 2008.  
 
CCES respondents may be somewhat more sophisticated or politically active than those in a probability 
sample, but such discrepancies should not threaten the internal validity of our experimental results.  
 
Procedure 
Our affirmation manipulation (adapted from Cohen, Aronson, and Steele ​2000​) asked respondents in the 
treatment group to select the value that is most important to them from a list and then to write about a 
time in which it was “especially important to you and made you feel good about yourself.”​ ​In the control 
condition, respondents instead reported what they had to eat or drink in the previous 48 hours.  
Information treatment 
Those in the graph condition saw the following: 
Below is a graph showing the number of insurgent attacks against US and coalition forces in Iraq per 







Our outcome of interest is factual beliefs about changes in attacks after the surge. After the manipulations, 
respondents were asked how the number of attacks changed on a five-point scale from “decreased 
substantially” to “increased substantially” . The exact wording is as follows: 
From what you know about the US involvement in Iraq, what has happened to the number of insurgent 
attacks in Iraq since the recent increase in troop levels (“the surge”) began?  
 
● Attacks have decreased substantially [1] 
● Attacks have decreased slightly [2] 
● Attacks have stayed the same [3] 
● Attacks have increased slightly [4] 
● Attacks have increased substantially [5] 
 
 As in each of our studies, responses were coded so that lower values indicate more accurate beliefs 




Our 2 x 2 design closely mirrors Study 1. Respondents are randomly assigned to a self-affirmation 
condition (Affirmation) or to a control condition. The self-affirmation and corresponding control 
condition are virtually identical to Study 1 except for the inclusion of several more choices of values in 
the self-affirmation exercise.  
Respondents were also randomly assigned to see a graph depicting the U.S. jobs trend and asked to assess 
the trend. 
Sample 
This study was conducted using Qualtrics with participants from Mechanical Turk (N = 247). In our 
sample, 41% of respondents were 18-29, 43% were 30-49, and 16% were 50 and over. 56% were female, 
4% were black, and 5% Hispanic. 10% had a high school degree or less, 33% had some college, and 58% 
had a college degree or greater. 53% identified as Democrats (with leaners), 30% as Republicans (with 
leaners), and 16% as independents. 
Information treatment 
Below is a graph showing the total number of jobs in the United States from January 2010 to January 
2011. Please take a moment to study it before proceeding. 
 
 
NOTE: The survey will allow you to move to the next page after a reasonable amount of time has elapsed. 
Please take all the time you need to study the graph below. 
 
Measures 
Our outcome measure is adapted from American National Election Study questions on economic trends 
(Bartels 2002) asking if the number of people with jobs in the country has gone up, stayed about the same, 
or gone down since January 2010. Using branching follow-ups, we constructed a five-point Likert scale 
ranging from “Gone up a lot” to “Gone down a lot.” As in each study, responses were coded so that 
higher values represent greater misperceptions (i.e. greater belief that jobs had gone down).​7 
Study 3 
Design  
We use a 2 x 3 design in which participants are randomly assigned to either a self-affirmation condition 
(Affirmation) or a non- affirmation control. They were also randomly assigned to see a graph or text 
about global temperatures, or a control.  
Sample  
The study was conducted in July–August 2011 using an online convenience sample from Qualtrics.com’s 
respondent panel. We limited this sample to respondents who previously self-identified as Republicans, 
the group that is most likely to hold inaccurate beliefs about global warming (McCright and Dunlap 
2011). We also excluded respondents who failed to pass a pre-treatment attention filter designed to make 
sure that subjects were carefully reading survey questions.  
This study was restricted to self-identified Republicans in an online convenience sample obtained from 
Qualtrics. As an initial check on data quality, we asked the standard ANES party identification questions. 
The data match the screening almost perfectly. Only five respondents (1%) self-identify as Democrats or 
Democratic leaners, while 2% identify as pure independents. The remaining 97% identify as Republicans 
– 48% as strong Republicans, 43% as weak Republicans, and 5% as Republican-leaning independents. 
The sample is less racially diverse (95% white) than Study 2, which was not pre-screened on party 
identification. However, we still see diversity in other demographics. For instance, the sample is slightly 
more female (51%) than male (49%) and more diverse by age than respondents in Study 2. 
 
Procedure 
The self-affirmation treatment and control conditions are identical to those in Study 2. Participants then 




Now we would like to turn to a different topic.  
 
Below is a graph showing changes in average global surface temperatures since 1940. Please take a 






Now we would like to turn to a different topic. 
  
Below is information about changes in average global surface temperatures since 1940. Please take a 
moment to study it before proceeding. (Note: A change of 1 degree Celsius = 1.8 degrees Fahrenheit.) 
  
Groups of scientists from several major institutions — NASA's Goddard Institute for Space Studies, the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's National Climatic Data Center, the Japanese 
Meteorological Agency and the Met Office Hadley Centre in the United Kingdom — tally data collected 
by temperature monitoring stations spread around the world. All four records show peaks and valleys that 
vary in virtual sync with each other. They each show an increase in average global surface temperatures 
of approximately 0.5 degrees Celsius over the last three decades. Data from each source also indicate that 




In this study, we measure respondents’ perceptions of global temperature change as well as their more 
general beliefs about global warming, a more politically salient topic where people might be more prone 
to motivated reasoning. The first outcome measure, Temperature change, asks if average global surface 
temperatures have gone up, stayed about the same, or gone down in the last 30 years. Using branching 
follow-ups, we construct a five- point Likert scale ranging from “Gone down a lot” to “Gone up a lot” 
where higher values indicate greater misperceptions (temperatures decreased significantly). Our second 
dependent variable, Global warming, asks respondents whether they believe global warming is a theory 
that has not yet been proven, a proven fact caused mostly by natural changes that have nothing to do with 
emissions from cars and industrial facilities, or a proven fact mostly caused by emissions from cars and 
industrial facilities. We ask this question before and after the experimental manipulations (the 
pre-treatment question is a control variable in analyses below). Both variables are coded so that higher 
values represent more misinformed views.  






H1: Self-Affirmation Will Mitigate Belief Superiority 
 
People exposed to a self-affirmation intervention will be less likely than those in a control condition to 
report that their beliefs on immigration are superior (aka, that those beliefs are more correct than 
alternatives).  
 
H2: Self-Affirmation Will Mitigate Belief Extremity 
 
People exposed to a self-affirmation intervention (vs. control) will also report less extreme beliefs on 
immigration. 
 
H3. Self-Affirmation Effects Will Be Stronger Among Strong Partisans than Weak Partisans 
 
The magnitude of the effects of the self-affirmation intervention on belief superiority and extremity will 




This was a two-condition between-subjects survey experiment. Respondents were randomly assigned to 
either a self-affirmation condition in which they were asked to recall examples of their most highly 
cherished characteristic or a control condition.  
Sample 
 
Participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk. This dataset includes 400 participants in the 




Participants were told at the outset that this was a study about "the nature of attitudes and beliefs about a 
variety of political topics in the United States." Participants provided responses to demographics, 
moderators, the self-affirmation exercise, dependent variables, an attention check, and a quality check.  
 
For Control, participants were asked to write down as many types of automobiles in the free-entry space 
as they could, and the Qualtrics page was time-locked for three minutes before they could move on.  For 
Self-Affirmation, participants were asked to rank 11 areas of values/characteristics about themselves (all 
available in dataset), and then to describe three personal experiences in which they exhibited the 






Belief extremity was computed by squaring the centered version of a 7-pt. immigration belief 
measure (M = 3.06, SD = 3.59). This immigration belief measures asked participants to indicate 
their agreement with the following statement: “The government should do more to secure U.S. 
borders to halt the flow of undocumented immigrants.”  
 
Belief superiority was captured by asking, “How much more correct are your views on 
immigration than other beliefs about this issue?” Participants responded to both measures using a 
5-point scale (1 = ​no more correct than other viewpoints​; 5 = ​totally correct – mine is the only 










RQ1. Does self-affirmation reduce affective polarization? 
Design 
2 cell between-subjects survey experiment. One manipulation randomly assigned respondents to an 
affirmation condition in which they were asked to recall an experience in which a self-chosen value 
played an important role in their life (Affirmation) or a control condition.  
Sample 
349 participants (56% male, mean age 35) were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk on 
August 1-2 2016. 
Procedure 
Value essay with control (where participants write about why the value might be important to someone 
else). It is very similar to the one used by Cohen, Aronson and Steele (2000) in their third study. 
Measures 
Dependent variables 
To measure affective polarization, two different measures were used. The first is via 100-pt. feeling 
thermometer attitudes towards own party and its presidential candidate and feeling thermometer 
attitudes toward other party and its presidential candidate. These two difference scores (between 
parties (M 41.77, SD = 29.72) and candidates (M = 41.83, SD = 37.45)) were averaged. (alpha = .68)  
The second approach used two items measuring intolerance towards party identifiers from opposing party. 
The first item was “Although I am a [Republican], I think that many [Democrats] have good reasons for 
holding the political views that they do”, on a 7-pt. Likert scale, rescaled to range from 0-1, M = .52, SD= 
.26). The second item was “On average, [Republicans] are less informed about society and politics than 
[Democrats]" also on a 7-pt. Likert scale, rescaled to range from 0-1, M = .59, SD= .27). 
 
Moderator  







Hypotheses and Research Question: 
 
H1. The expectation is that self-affirmation will reduce message derogation toward the 
counter-attitudinal article, thus narrowing the evaluation gap between pro- and 
counter-attitudinal articles.  
 
RQ1. The relevant vs. irrelevant self-affirmation manipulation was considered an open research 
question. It is possible that the relevant self-affirmation (by priming political values) will exacerbate, 
rather than reduce, biased processing. But with the lack of clarity in the literature regarding related 
vs. unrelated self-affirmation, I am not comfortable enough to advance a firm hypothesis.  
 
Design​:  
3 (Affirmation: control vs. irrelevant vs. relevant) X 2 (article type: real vs. hoax) factorial design. 
Sample​: A convenience sample of the general public recruited by undergraduate students in a research 
methods class (N = 455). Participants completed study online using SurveyMonkey. No compensation 
was provided. Data were collected in 2013.  
Procedures​: 
Study began with an affirmation task (essay writing in response to two short prompts – why something 
is important or good and describe an experience with it) 
• Control condition wrote about a fruit that is ranked third on a list of 5 (apple, banana, etc.) 
• Irrelevant condition wrote about top-ranked positive personal trait out of 5 (eg kindness, 
honesty) 
• Relevant condition wrote about a top-ranked social political value out of 5 (social equality, 
gay rights, right to bear arms, etc.) 
After self-affirmation, participants were randomly assigned to read one of two news articles 
• Climate change is real and should be addressed now 
• Facts and hype about climate change (essentially suggesting climate change is a hoax) 
After reading the article, participants rated the article on a number of dimensions, including credibility, 




The primary dependent variable is a scale of 16 7-pt Likert news evaluation items (M = 3.83, SD = 
1.03, alpha = .84). This composite scale is the average of liking (1 item; M = 3.80, SD = 1.38), a 
credibility scale (7 items; M = 3.77, SD = 1.11, alpha = .84) and a perceived message quality scale (8 




Party (3 pt.: Republican, Democrat, Independent). 
Appendix 2. Regression Tables 
 
Team A - Conspiracy beliefs    
  Liberal conspiracy theory beliefs 
  B Robust SE p 95% CI 
Republican -0.11 0.01 0.000 -0.13 -0.09 
Self-Affirmation 0.00 0.01 0.729 -0.02 0.01 
Affirmation x Republican 0.02 0.01 0.083 0.00 0.05 
Constant 0.48 0.01 0.000 0.47 0.49 
N     3796 
R2         0.06 
      
  Conservative conspiracy theory beliefs 
Republican 0.22 0.01 0.000 0.20 0.24 
Self-Affirmation 0.01 0.01 0.087 0.00 0.03 
Affirmation x Republican 0.01 0.01 0.404 -0.01 0.03 
Constant 0.29 0.00 0.000 0.28 0.29 
N     3797 
R2         0.27 
      
Team B- Climate change attitudes     
  Climate change attitudes  
  B Robust SE p 95% CI 
Self-Affirmation 0.02 0.04 0.598 -0.05 0.09 
Ideology -0.11 0.01 0.000 -0.13 -0.08 
Affirmation x ideology -0.03 0.02 0.180 -0.07 0.01 
Constant 0.87 0.02 0.000 0.82 0.92 
N     696 
R2         0.19 
      
      
Team C- Affective polarization     
  Affective polarization (FT) 
  B Robust SE p 95% CI 
Self-Affirmation 0.02 0.02 0.458 -0.03 0.06 
Strength of partisanship 0.10 0.01 0.000 0.09 0.11 
Affirmation X strength -0.01 0.01 0.386 -0.03 0.01 
Constant 0.49 0.01 0.000 0.47 0.52 
N     1334 
R2         0.23 
      
  Discussion polarization 
Self-Affirmation 0.04 0.02 0.132 -0.01 0.08 
Strength of partisanship 0.08 0.01 0.000 0.06 0.10 
Affirmation X strength -0.02 0.01 0.050 -0.05 0.00 
Constant 0.48 0.02 0.000 0.45 0.51 
N     1338 
R2         0.09 
      
  Outparty danger 
Self-Affirmation 0.05 0.03 0.136 -0.02 0.11 
Strength of partisanship 0.08 0.01 0.000 0.06 0.10 
Affirmation X strength -0.03 0.02 0.100 -0.06 0.00 
Constant 0.59 0.02 0.000 0.54 0.63 
N     1345 
R2         0.05 
      
  Social distance 
Self-Affirmation -0.05 0.03 0.121 -0.12 0.01 
Strength of partisanship 0.02 0.01 0.133 -0.01 0.04 
Affirmation X strength 0.02 0.02 0.237 -0.01 0.05 
Constant 0.23 0.02 0.000 0.18 0.27 
N     1333 
R2         0.01 
      
      
Team D- Factual beliefs      
  Study 1: Party-aligned blame 
  B Robust SE p 95% CI   
Self-Affirmation -0.05 0.04 0.139 -0.12 0.02 
Strength of partisanship 0.16 0.07 0.034 0.01 0.30 
Affirmation X strength -0.04 0.09 0.650 -0.22 0.14 
Constant 0.40 0.02 0.000 0.36 0.45 
N     130 
R2         0.12 
      
  Study 2: Party-aligned risk perception 
Self-Affirmation 0.00 0.03 0.943 -0.06 0.05 
Strength of partisanship 0.10 0.03 0.000 0.04 0.15 
Affirmation X strength 0.00 0.04 0.927 -0.08 0.08 
Constant 0.54 0.02 0.000 0.50 0.59 
N     274 
R2         0.08 
      
      
Team E - Misperceptions     
      
  Study 1: Attacks after troop surge 
  B Robust SE p 95% CI 
Self-Affirmation 0.00 0.04 0.928 -0.08 0.09 
Iraq withdrawl 0.11 0.02 0.000 0.08 0.15 
Affirmation x withdrawal 0.00 0.02 0.879 -0.04 0.05 
Constant -0.06 0.03 0.027 -0.12 -0.01 
N     525 
R2         0.13 
      
  Study 2: Jobs trend 
  B Robust SE p 95% CI   
Self-Affirmation -0.02 0.05 0.656 -0.13 0.08 
Economy import 0.03 0.03 0.280 -0.03 0.09 
Obama disapproval -0.06 0.03 0.053 -0.12 0.00 
Affirmation x economy 0.01 0.06 0.802 -0.10 0.12 
Affirmation x disapproval 0.02 0.06 0.764 -0.10 0.13 
Constant 0.76 0.03 0.000 0.70 0.82 
N     247 
R2         0.03 
      
  Study 3: Global warming (text) 
  B Robust SE p 95% CI 
      
Self-Affirmation -0.03 0.13 0.795 -0.29 0.22 
Strong Republican 0.13 0.11 0.241 -0.09 0.34 
Affirmation x strong Republican -0.05 0.17 0.756 -0.38 0.28 
Constant 0.58 0.08 0.000 0.43 0.73 
N     122 
R2         0.02 
      
  Study 3: Global warming (graph) 
Self-Affirmation 0.14 0.11 0.214 -0.08 0.37 
Strong Republican 0.16 0.11 0.150 -0.06 0.37 
Affirmation x strong Republican -0.31 0.15 0.044 -0.62 -0.01 
Constant 0.48 0.08 0.000 0.31 0.65 
N     122 
R2         0.03 
      
  Study 3: Temperature trend (text) 
Self-Affirmation -0.03 0.06 0.566 -0.15 0.08 
Strong Republican 0.02 0.05 0.607 -0.07 0.12 
Affirmation x strong Republican -0.03 0.08 0.713 -0.19 0.13 
Constant 0.41 0.03 0.000 0.35 0.47 
N     122 
R2         0.01 
      
  Study 3: Temperature trend (graph) 
Self-Affirmation 0.05 0.06 0.438 -0.07 0.16 
Strong Republican 0.01 0.06 0.852 -0.10 0.12 
Affirmation x strong Republican -0.06 0.08 0.468 -0.23 0.10 
Constant 0.23 0.04 0.000 0.15 0.31 
N     121 
R2         0.01 
      
      
      
Team F - Immigration belief superiority    
  Belief superiority 
  B Robust SE p 95% CI 
Self-Affirmation -0.02 0.06 0.715 -0.15 0.10 
Strength of partisanship 0.03 0.03 0.267 -0.03 0.09 
Affirmation X strength -0.01 0.04 0.780 -0.09 0.07 
Constant 0.31 0.05 0.000 0.21 0.40 
N     393 
R2         0.01 
      
  Belief extremity 
Self-Affirmation -0.01 0.05 0.829 -0.12 0.09 
Strength of partisanship 0.01 0.02 0.694 -0.03 0.05 
Affirmation X strength 0.00 0.03 0.883 -0.07 0.06 
Constant 0.20 0.03 0.000 0.13 0.27 
N     393 
R2         0.00 
      
      
 
Team G - Affective polarization      
  Affective polarization (FTs) 
  B Robust SE p 95% CI 
Self-Affirmation 0.05 0.12 0.678 -0.19 0.28 
Strength of partisanship 0.16 0.03 0.000 0.09 0.22 
Affirmation X strength -0.02 0.05 0.610 -0.12 0.07 
Constant 0.31 0.08 0.000 0.15 0.47 
N     204 
R2         0.15 
      
  Outparty intolerance (item 1)) 
Self-Affirmation -0.18 0.18 0.331 -0.54 0.18 
Strength of partisanship -0.15 0.06 0.007 -0.26 -0.04 
Affirmation X strength 0.08 0.08 0.347 -0.08 0.23 
Constant 0.88 0.13 0.000 0.63 1.14 
N     204 
R2         0.05 
      
  Outparty intolerance (item 2) 
Self-Affirmation -0.02 0.19 0.934 -0.39 0.36 
Strength of partisanship 0.10 0.05 0.074 -0.01 0.21 
Affirmation X strength 0.00 0.08 0.983 -0.16 0.16 
Constant 0.37 0.13 0.004 0.12 0.62 
N     203 
R2         0.03 
      
      
Team H - News evaluations       
  News evaluations (Climate change is a hoax) 
  B Robust SE p 95% CI 
      
Self-Affirmation -0.02 0.07 0.826 -0.16 0.13 
Political Self-Affirmation -0.04 0.07 0.563 -0.17 0.09 
Party 0.00 0.03 0.916 -0.05 0.05 
Affirmation x party 0.01 0.03 0.874 -0.06 0.07 
Political affirmation x party 0.02 0.03 0.594 -0.05 0.09 
Constant 0.48 0.05 0.000 0.38 0.57 



























Reanalysis of affirmation effects across information treatments 
 
Team E – Misperceptions 
 
R2         0.00 
      
  News evaluations (Climate change is real) 
Self-Affirmation 0.03 0.07 0.690 -0.11 0.16 
Political Self-Affirmation -0.06 0.09 0.524 -0.25 0.13 
Party -0.03 0.02 0.210 -0.08 0.02 
Affirmation x party 0.01 0.03 0.876 -0.06 0.07 
Political affirmation x party 0.02 0.04 0.667 -0.06 0.10 
Constant 0.49 0.05 0.000 0.39 0.60 
N     220 
R2         0.03 
      
 Study 1: Attacks after troop surge 
 
 
  B Robust SE p 95% CI 
Self-affirmation -0.02 0.04 0.659 -0.11 0.07 
Iraq withdrawal 0.13 0.01 0.000 0.11 0.16 
Affirmation x withdrawal -0.02 0.02 0.420 -0.06 0.02 
Graph -0.09 0.02 0.000 -0.14 -0.05 
Affirmation X graph 0.06 0.05 0.275 -0.05 0.17 
Affirmation X graph X withdrawal 0.00 0.03 0.882 -0.05 0.05 
Constant -0.01 0.03 0.843 -0.06 0.05 
N     987 
R2         0.16 
 Study 2: Jobs trend 
  B Robust SE p 95% CI 
Self-affirmation -0.01 0.05 0.785 -0.10 0.08 
Graph 0.29 0.03 0.000 0.24 0.34 
Economy import -0.02 0.03 0.439 -0.08 0.03 
Obama disapproval -0.12 0.03 0.000 -0.18 -0.07 
Affirmation X economy -0.03 0.05 0.605 -0.13 0.08 
Affirmation X disapproval 0.08 0.05 0.162 -0.03 0.18 
Affirmation X graph -0.06 0.06 0.301 -0.19 0.06 
Affirmation X graph X economy 0.10 0.06 0.141 -0.03 0.22 
Affirmation X graph X disapproval 0.01 0.07 0.912 -0.13 0.14 
Constant 0.53 0.03 0.000 0.47 0.58 
N     471 
R2         0.31 
  Study 3: Temperature trend 
  B Robust SE p 95% CI 
Self-affirmation -0.08 0.06 0.157 -0.19 0.03 
Strong Republican -0.01 0.03 0.794 -0.08 0.06 
Affirmation X strong Republican 0.16 0.07 0.031 0.01 0.30 
Graph -0.11 0.02 0.000 -0.15 -0.07 
Text -0.04 0.04 0.393 -0.12 0.05 
Affirmation X text 0.03 0.08 0.671 -0.12 0.19 
Affirmation X graph 0.06 0.04 0.125 -0.02 0.13 
Affirmation X text x strong Rep. -0.15 0.09 0.091 -0.33 0.02 
Affirmation X graph x strong Rep. -0.10 0.04 0.025 -0.19 -0.01 
Constant 0.46 0.04 0.000 0.39 0.53 
N     357 
R2         0.14 
      
 
 
Team H– News evaluations 
 
 
















  Study 3: Global warming 
Self-affirmation -0.13 0.10 0.216 -0.33 0.08 
Strong Republican 0.07 0.06 0.274 -0.05 0.19 
Affirmation X strong Republican 0.15 0.12 0.238 -0.10 0.39 
Graph -0.07 0.04 0.065 -0.14 0.00 
Text -0.06 0.07 0.417 -0.20 0.08 
Affirmation X text 0.07 0.15 0.653 -0.23 0.37 
Affirmation X graph 0.11 0.07 0.108 -0.02 0.25 
Affirmation X text x strong Rep. -0.14 0.17 0.409 -0.47 0.19 
Affirmation X graph x strong Rep. -0.18 0.08 0.017 -0.33 -0.03 
Constant 0.66 0.06 0.000 0.56 0.77 
N     358 
R2         0.03 
 News evaluations 
  B Robust SE p 95% CI 
Self-affirmation 0.07 0.09 0.463 -0.11 0.24 
Message (CC real vs hoax) -0.07 0.04 0.056 -0.14 0.00 
Political affirmation 0.01 0.04 0.848 -0.06 0.08 
Self-affirmation X message -0.02 0.06 0.671 -0.14 0.09 
Constant 0.56 0.06 0.000 0.43 0.68 
N     129 
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